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Verizon’s pending appeal of the Federal Communications Commission’s net neutrality order 
presents one of the most significant legal questions in modern telecommunications policy: 
whether, and to what extent, the Commission can regulate Internet activity. New Commission 
Chairman Tom Wheeler has stated clearly that “regulating the Internet is a non-starter.”1 But the 
Commission’s actions over the last several years belie that notion. Since 2007, the Commission 
has enacted binding regulations on a wide range of actors within the Internet ecosystem, 
including Internet service providers,2 Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) applications,3 Over-
the-Top text message services,4 and Internet-based providers of Telecommunications Relay 
Services.5 The Commission enacted each of these rules pursuant to a theory of jurisdiction that, 
at times, has seemed virtually limitless in its reach over any communication by wire or radio. 
 
Whether the agency will successfully defend its net neutrality rules will turn largely upon its 
ability to defend this jurisdictional theory, known as Title I ancillary authority. At first glance, 
one might think the agency’s chances are good: the United States Supreme Court has long 
recognized that Title I allows the Commission to oversee at least some communications beyond 
the broadcasters and telephone companies that lay at its historical regulatory core. Title I acts as 
the rough agency equivalent of the Constitution's "necessary and proper" clause, permitting the 
Commission to regulate other communications by wire or radio if such regulation is “necessary 
to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.”6 
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But the legal arguments over net neutrality show that the Commission’s recent reliance on Title I 
is both quantitatively and qualitatively unmoored from its historical origins. The Commission 
has invoked its ancillary authority roughly as often in the past six years as it did in the preceding 
seventy-three years combined. And it has increasingly done so not to perfect its statutory 
obligations over twentieth century broadcasting, cable, and telephone networks, but to create 
new obligations on twenty-first century IP networks. 
 
In an apparent attempt to remain relevant in light of technological change, the Commission seeks 
to transform itself from an agency that carries out a congressional mandate to one that creates 
common-law-like regulation of the Internet. But the Commission’s ancillary authority cannot 
support such lofty aspirations. The statute, prior case law, and basic rule of law principles require 
that any claimed authority be subject to principled constraints.  
 
The Origins of Title I Ancillary Authority 
 
Admittedly, some agencies have wide-ranging authority to regulate broad swaths of the economy 
in common law-like fashion. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, has been charged by 
Congress generally to prohibit “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”7 Courts have interpreted this language to authorize the 
agency to develop and enforce America’s competition law by regulating anticompetitive conduct 
by companies throughout the economy, subject to judicial review. 
 
But the Federal Communications Commission does not have such a broad, free-ranging statutory 
mandate. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, has three substantive titles: Title II, 
governing common carriers of interstate telecommunications; Title III, regulating broadcasters 
and other spectrum licensees; and Title VI, covering cable television networks. Each title 
contains a lengthy statutory scheme by which Congress has established the laws governing the 
communications network in question. In each title, the Commission’s rulemaking authority is 
tethered to its statutory mandate. Title II, for example, provides that the Commission “may 
prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter.”8 Title III allows the agency to issue licenses in the public interest and 
“make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent 
with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”9 And while Title VI 
does not contain a parallel grant of rulemaking authority, it makes clear that the Commission 
“may not impose requirements regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as 
expressly provided in this subchapter.”10 Thus each title ties the agency’s rulemaking authority, 
in some way, specifically to the goal of carrying out Congress’s mandate.  
 
The potential ambiguity comes in Title I, which contains an additional general grant of 
rulemaking authority. Section 4(i) of the Act provides that the agency may “perform any and all 
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”11 This seemingly sweeping grant of authority 
is nestled amidst a series of provisions about the general administrative structure of the 
Commission – wedged between a clause establishing the agency’s official seal and a discussion 
of conduct at agency proceedings. 
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In a seminal Harvard Law Review article about grants of rulemaking authority to agencies, 
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts argue that this clause was originally intended to 
grant the agency only “procedural rulemaking powers,” not a general power to make legislative 
rules.12 In addition to its placement in the statute, Merrill and Watts note that the 
Communications Act was based upon the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The analogue to 
Section 4(i) in the ICA, Section 17, granted only procedural powers, not legislative powers.13 
Moreover, they note that Section 4(i) was part of the original draft bill and was neither amended 
during debate nor even mentioned in any of the Committee reports on the Communications Act. 
“It is most unlikely,” they surmise, “that this provision would have been entirely uncontroversial 
if it had been understood as conferring general legislative rulemaking authority on the FCC.”14 
 
The Supreme Court initially took a far more expansive reading. In United States v. Southwestern 
Cable Co.,15 several cable companies challenged a Commission regulation limiting the 
importation of out-of-market broadcast signals.16 At the time, the Commission had direct 
regulatory authority only over Title II common carriers and Title III broadcasters. Cable 
programmers, which were primarily retransmitters of broadcast signals, fell under neither title. 
But the Court explained that Congress “gave the Commission ‘a comprehensive mandate,’ with 
‘not niggardly but expansive powers.’”17 Section 2(a) provides that the Act “shall apply to all 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio,” not just broadcasters and telephone 
companies. And the Commission argued that its regulation was necessary to prevent cable 
companies from interfering with the agency’s statutory efforts to promote local broadcasting and 
mitigate interference among broadcasters. Given this direct statutory mandate, the Court 
concluded that the Commission could restrict cable retransmission of broadcast content even if 
cable providers fit under neither of the Act’s two substantive provisions.18 
 
But subsequent cases limited the scope of this “ancillary authority.” In Midwest Video I, a 
fractured Court narrowly upheld a rule requiring that cable retransmitters of broadcast content 
also facilitate locally produced non-broadcast content.19 The plurality explained that under 
Southwestern Cable, the Commission’s general authority extended only to rules that are 
“reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of its various responsibilities.”20 In this case, 
the local origination rule assured that when retransmitting broadcast content, cable companies 
further the Commission’s objective of “providing suitably diversified programming.” The 
plurality explained that the rule was similar to regulations governing technological quality of 
retransmitted broadcast signals – except that it was focused on quality of content rather than 
quality of the picture and audio received by the viewer.21  
 
As James Speta, a fellow Member of the Free State Foundation Board of Academic Advisors, 
has noted,22 Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence in the judgment is even more limited. Burger 
noted that the case “presents questions of extraordinary difficulty” and that “the Commission’s 
position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction” implicated by 
Southwestern Cable.23 Ultimately, Burger upheld the local origination rule because “[t]hose who 
exploit the existing broadcast signals for private commercial [gain]…are not exactly strangers to 
the stream of broadcasting…. [W]hen they interrupt the signal and put it to their own use for 
profit, they take on burdens, one of which is regulation by the Commission.”24 Professor Speta 
explains that Burger’s theory “is much narrower than the plurality’s; it essentially says that the 
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FCC could forbid the carriage of broadcast signals on cable (a seemingly uncontroversial 
proposition) and, as such, it can also impose conditions.”25 And because Burger’s vote was 
necessary to secure a majority, its narrower reading should control the scope of the agency’s 
Title I authority. 
 
The Court enforced these limits in Midwest Video II.26 This case involved Commission rules 
requiring cable companies to carry specific channels for public, educational, government, and 
leased access programming. The Court ruled it was insufficient that the Commission found these 
rules were “reasonably related” to the agency’s “statutory objectives.”27 Rather, the 
Commission’s authority to regulate cable was “delimited by its statutory responsibilities over 
television broadcasting.”28 Although the agency’s objective – promoting localism and diversity – 
a were similar to those in Midwest Video I, its methodology – treating cable companies as 
common carriers of local content – contravened the Act’s provisions that protect the “journalistic 
freedom of persons engaged in broadcasting.” Because the Act expressly prohibits the 
Commission from subjecting broadcasters to common carriage obligations, the Commission 
cannot foist such obligations on cable companies in the interests of promoting its broadcast 
obligations. Such regulations, held the court, went beyond the Commission’s “circumscribed 
range of power” under Title I and must instead “come specifically from Congress.”29 
 
This cable trilogy emphasizes that the Commission’s Title I authority must be related to a direct 
statutory mandate, although the cases do not clearly articulate how close a fit is required. 
Professor Speta reads the cases to suggest that Title I can only extend to communications 
networks that are “providing or carrying a service regulated by the Communications Act.”30 This 
reading would accord with the facts of the cable trilogy: Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video 
I both involved cable systems that carried regulated broadcast signals, a fact that was key to 
Justice Burger’s concurrence, while Midwest Video II involved direct cable regulation 
independent of broadcast transport.  
 
At the other pole, one might read the cable trilogy broadly to suggest that Title I extends to any 
communication by wire or radio whose effect is not inconsistent with the Act. One may glean 
such a rule from the holding in Midwest Video II, which invalidated cable common carriage 
because it conflicted with the Act’s policy against abrogating broadcasters’ editorial control. But 
this “all that is not prohibited is permissible” interpretation ignores the Court’s repeated 
admonition that “the Commission was not delegated unrestrained authority” and that any such 
exercise must further a statutory objective. “[W]ithout reference to the provisions of the Act 
directly governing broadcasting,” the Midwest Video II Court explained, “the Commission’s 
jurisdiction under Section 2(a) would be unbounded.” 
 
Perhaps the best interpretation flows from the Act itself. First, Title I authority can only be used 
to reach entities engaged in “interstate communication by wire or radio.” This observation should 
be relatively uncontroversial, although on occasion courts have had to remind the Commission of 
this limit.31 Second, the Commission should only regulate these entities if it can show that the 
regulation in question is “necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory 
responsibilities.”32 Midwest Video II emphasized this language, which is taken directly from, 
and therefore cabins, Section 4(i)’s general rulemaking power. 
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The FCC's Modern Abuse of Ancillary Authority 
 
In the years following Midwest Video II, the Commission only occasionally invoked its ancillary 
authority, often to impose additional regulatory requirements on services that were subject to the 
agency’s direct authority. For example, the Commission used ancillary authority to require 
individual shareholders to divest themselves of stock held in violation of the agency’s multiple 
ownership rules,33 to impose syndicated exclusivity rules on cable operators (which are, since 
1984, directly regulated by the agency),34 and to impose common carriage obligations on LEC 
voluntary physical collocation offerings.35  
 
But as broadband Internet services began to displace traditional communications services, the 
Commission has seen both quantitative and qualitative changes in the use of its Title I authority. 
The Commission has invoked its ancillary authority roughly 65 times since 2007 – 
approximately the same number of times it has invoked its ancillary authority during the entirety 
of its history up to that point. In other words, about half of the agency’s total invocations of its 
Title I authority have come in the last seven years.36 And a growing number of these Title I rules 
are aimed not at broadcast, cable, and telephone service, but at broadband Internet service 
providers and those who provide certain Internet-based services. Rather than using ancillary 
authority as a tool to carry out Congress’s statutory mandates, the Commission is grasping at 
statutory language to justify imposing its own mandates over broadband networks and the 
services that use them. 
 
In the process, the connection between the Commission’s rules and its underlying statute has 
grown increasingly tenuous. This is perhaps best exemplified by its infamous Comcast order, in 
which the Commission tried to sanction Comcast Corporation for throttling BitTorrent content 
over its broadband networks. To justify its new rule prohibiting unreasonable network 
management practices, the agency relied primarily upon two statements of general policy: 
Section 1, which declares the purpose of the Commission is to make a nationwide 
communications service available to all people at reasonable rates, and Section 230(b), which 
states that it is the policy of the United States to promote the continued development of the 
Internet.37  
 
But the DC Circuit found these statutory provisions were insufficient to support the 
Commission’s claim of ancillary authority. The Court explained that ancillary authority cannot 
be used simply to pursue general statements of policy, but only in conjunction with an “express 
delegation of authority to the Commission” – a distinction supported by Midwest Video.38 Policy 
statements do not create any binding mandates that the agency must enforce, that would be 
furthered by its exercise of ancillary authority. More generally, this theory affords few, if any, 
limits on the agency’s ancillary authority. Almost any regulation could be justified as furthering 
the generic goal of making nationwide communications service available at reasonable rates, or 
promoting the development of the Internet. This jurisdictional claim is untenable, explained the 
Court, because it would “virtually free the Commission from its congressional tether.”39 
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Undeterred, the Commission has responded with a net neutrality order that relies on ancillary 
authority to impose an even more rigorous regulatory scheme on broadband providers.40 This 
time, the agency anchors its claims to Section 706, which provides that the Commission and state 
regulators  
 
shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, 
elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner 
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap 
regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to 
infrastructure investment.41 
 
But this statutory language suffers the same flaw. Section 706 provides no express statutory 
mandate that the Commission must accomplish. It is unclear how net neutrality is “necessary to 
the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities” of removing barriers to 
infrastructure investment. As many commenters pointed out, the order is more likely to add 
barriers to investment by increasing the costs of providing broadband service. And like the 
Comcast order, there is virtually no limit to the potential regulations that could be justified under 
this theory. A theory of ancillary authority that allows the agency unlimited jurisdiction over 
services mentioned only in passing in the Act would ultimately “free the Commission from its 
congressional tether.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a sense, the Commission’s effort to stretch its ancillary authority to encompass Internet 
service and activities is understandable. Consumers are fleeing the twentieth century 
communications networks that lay at its regulatory core, at an unprecedented rate. They are 
instead focusing on twenty-first century IP networks, which are similar in some ways to their 
predecessors, but also different in many ways. Thus far, Congress has not provided the 
Commission guidance regarding what, if anything, it should do in response to this transition. So 
the Commission has attempted to fill the policy void itself, using whatever tools it perceives to 
be at its disposal.  
 
But the Commission cannot use Title I to freelance at the edge of its statutory authority. Both the 
language of the Act and the cable cases teach that ancillary authority allows the Commission 
flexibility when carrying out the will of Congress – not to make new rules when Congress fails 
to act. The distinction was captured well by Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence in Midwest 
Video I: “The almost explosive development of [cable television] suggests the need of a 
comprehensive re-examination of the statutory scheme as it relates to this new development, so 
that the basic policies are considered by Congress and not left entirely to the Commission and the 
courts.” Similarly, the explosive growth of the Internet suggests the need to revisit the Act yet 
again. Going forward, the basic policies of American communications law must be set by 
Congress, not the agency. In its current form, the Communications Act offers only thin reeds, 
reeds that cannot support the weight of an agency-manufactured "law of the Internet." 
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